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Price Dispersion on Payday Loan Market in




This thesis aims to enlighten, why there exists intense price dispersion
on payday loans market in Finland, even though payday loans can be
seen as a homogeneous goods. The dispersion is observed on one period
between firms and is made apparent by calculating annual percentage
rates for loans with di↵erent sizes and di↵erent payback times. After
that the dispersion is first reflected against literature, that covers price
dispersion in settings, where consumer is faced with search costs and when
she su↵ers from biases, that lead to consistent failure in optimization. Due
to the search cost consumers might search too little and this allows firms
to charge higher than competitive prices, whereas behavioral issues expose
consumers to pay too much, when they do not have realistic expectations
for example on their future demand. Second, dispersion is covered in the
light of credit screening literature, that suggests when firms screen out
risky consumers based on di↵erent criterion, they naturally set rates to
cover for the risk that they engage in. It is also showed, that the sales of
firms are dispersed, which following the standard industrial organizations
theory would suggest, that the firms do not have equal costs. Taking
account Finnish collective labor agreements operational costs might be
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1 Introduction
The aim of this thesis is to describe and analyse price dispersion in payday loan
market in Finland. Approach taken here is descriptive. Data of Finnish payday
loan prices for di↵erent sizes of loans with di↵erent payback times have been
collected, and the observed dispersion in each setting have been encapsulated in
distributions. Analysis has been based on modern industrial organizations and
consumer screening literature and it aims to highlight the reasons, why there
exists a great deal of variation in payday loan market, and why some firms are
able to charge very high rates, yet maintain profitable. First in this introductory
section motivation for the study has been crystallized. Second the payday loan
market in Finland is described in detail and third the reader is walked through
the structure of the thesis.
1.1 Motivation
The price dispersion in payday loan market is an interesting phenomenon as
it seems to persist, even though there seems to exist lot of competition on
the industry of a homogeneous good. The prices in the industry can be made
comparable by calculating annual percentage rates, that are covered thoroughly
late in this thesis. Take for example a 500 euro loan, of which annual percentage
rate can vary from around 30% all the way up to almost 2000%, when the loan
is paid up one month after the withdrawal. Competition in the industry seems
very fierce on the first glance, as the number of firms in the industry defined for
the purpose of this thesis is around 24. In addition all the payday loan brands
in this thesis are able to maintain sales and are likely to have positive profits.
The pricing schemes or pricing vectors in which firms engage in, have multi-
ple dimensions that make the comparison of alternatives troublesome. Prices of
payday loans typically vary at least in monthly rate, withdrawal fee, monthly
payment and payback time, that all a↵ect the net price the consumer faces.
More accurate description of payday loans can be found in Section 2.1.1. Set-
ting up complicated pricing schemes is also common in many other industries
like for example in cell phone plans, that are many times also sold together with
phones. Fruits can be sold using per kilo or per unit prices. Even online book
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stores might make their pricing shady, if they take part of their profit in delivery
fees. Only imagination limits the ways how one can make own price di cult to
compare with the competitors.
The payday loan industry can also be seen in a social context. High prices
that cannot be perceived due to obfuscation can be harmful for the consumers,
who would get cheaper loans, were they able to compare prices across firms.
Great proportion of consumer surplus is spent first onon searching prices and
then comparing them among firms. Some legislational limitation on pricing
would benefit consumers by reducing the search cost, which might in turn
counter intuitively increase competition by reducing number of firms and low-
ering prices. Also price comparison services that might arise in the need of
performing the comparison for the consumer could benefit the consumers.
1.2 Payday loan market in Finland
The Finnish payday loan market consists of at least 24 firms that o↵er payday
loans meant in this thesis. It is di cult to say, if these are all the companies
operating in this specific industry, as the firms operate in the internet and they
share classification with other types of companies in public company registers.
However extensive search was carried around in internet, in order to identify
most of the firms of interest. Around 7/10 of the firms are based in Finland,
3 companies are branches of Swedish consumer credit companies, one of the
companies is listed on London stock exchange and one of the companies is based
on USA and these two have Finnish subsidiaries. The origins the companies are
summarized in the appendix.
The firms chosen for analysis in this thesis go around limitation of rates by
granting credit limit loans, that are at least 2000 euros. Law for interest rates
in Finland assesses the upper limit of rates to be reference rate incremented at
most by 50% -points, whenever the loan or credit limit is lower than 2000 euros.
Now it is easy for the companies to set the credit limit to at least 2000 euros,
in order to freely set the rate in the market. The consumer can than make
withdrawals up to the credit limit. For some consumers of payday loans it can
be di cult to get a loan from more traditional sources of financing like banks
or credit card companies. On the other hand it can be di cult for anyone to be
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financed quickly for a short period of time for example if car suddenly breaks
down and has to be prepared. Risky customer portfolio and short period loan
demand would together suggest relatively high rates to the market.
The establishment of firms in the industry is characterized by relatively low
fixed costs and easiness of getting permission for lending activities. European
central bank grants permissions for credit communities, that include payday
loan providers, that are taken account in this thesis. According to Statistics
Finland the average number of started and ended companies on financial ser-
vices industry between years 2005 and 2013 have been 234 and 180 in a year
respectively and no significant deviation from these figures exists during the
time span. The payday loan providers that have exited the market between
years 2005 and 2013, might be included in these figures beside other types of
credit providers. The data does not draw accurate picture how likely it is, that
the firms of interest can persist on the market. Insurance and pension activ-
ities have been excluded from the data set. Suomen virallinen tilasto (SVT)
(viitattu: 4.5.2016)
Elliehausen and Lawrence (2001) have used a nationally representative sam-
ple of payday loan consumers in the U.S. to describe typical consumers on the
market. According to the survey over half of payday loan customers have family
incomes between $25000 and $49999, and compared to general population they
are less likely to have low or higher incomes. Like in Finland, also in the area the
study was conducted, it is required for payday loan customers to have a bank
or checking account, which is likely to reduce number of low income consumers
in the U.S.. In Finland this is not so clear, as everyone is entitled to a bank
account. On the other end higher income families hold more liquid assets and
have better access to other sources of credit.
The survey reveals that consumers of payday loans are relatively young.
Two-thirds of the consumers are under 45-years-old and 36,4% are under 35
and only 10% of the consumers are over 55. 57% of the surveyed are either
married or living with a partner. 16,8% have never been married and 23,0%
were divorced or separated. Only 2,4% were widowed. Most of the consumers
have acquired only a low level of education, but only 6,2% have no high school
diploma at all. Almost same proportion of consumers of these loans have either
6
finished high school or have attended some college percentages being 38,3% and
36,1% respectively. Quite high proportion of 19,4% of the consumers have a
college degree. The attitudes towards credit are positive among the surveyed.
82,3% either somewhat or strongly agree with a statement ”Most people benefit
from the use of credit”. Only 6,8% answered that they strongly disagree with
the statement. In addition it is worth mentioning that 78,2% agree with a
statement ”Overspending is the fault of the consumers, not the lenders”.
Most of the consumers perceive the payday loans to be more expensive or
equally expensive with returned check fees, late fees on rent or mortgage or late
fees on credit card or other consumer debt. Return check fee is charge from not
having coverage on one’s check account, and the check is returned to the owner
of the account. On the other hand it is bit worrying, that around 22% of the
consumers thought, that the fees mentioned were actually lower compared to
prices of payday loans. There were also some consumers, who were not able to
tell, whether they think that the prices are lower or higher than returned check
fees, late fees on rent or mortgage and late fees on other consumer debt. This
could give evidence, that due to firms practicing obfuscation, some consumer
are not able to perceive the prices correctly.
1.3 Structure of the thesis
In the Section 2 relevant literature on price dispersion and payday loans are
introduced. Payday loans are also defined for the purpose of this thesis. A part
of covered literature consists of papers concentrating price dispersion arising
from search costs, that the consumers face, when they go through alternative
providers. Another part takes account behavioral aspects, that can be seen
inducing search costs for consumers and firms exploiting them. Also papers that
cover purposeful shading of pricing, obfuscation, are introduced. Also literature
on consumer screening is covered in this section, in order to show, how firms
e↵ort to screen out too risky customers might also induce price dispersion in
the market.
Next in the Section 3 the methodology for making the loans with di↵erent
price features comparable is described. The section enlightens, how the ele-
ments of price schemes periodical rates, withdrawal fees payback times etc. are
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summed up into annual percentage rate using the formula for internal rate of
return. In order to have an output of meaningful figures, some additional as-
sumptions were made and they are described in this section. Also the strengths
and weaknesses of annual percentage rate approach are evaluated.
After that in the Section 3 the price data for 100, 300, 500 and 1500 euro
loans are described with di↵erent payback times. Also the corresponding price
distributions are drawn from the tables and presented here. In addition the
data on firm turnovers from year 2014 can be found in this section. For all the
data sets also averages, medians, standard deviations and variances for all the
data sets were calculated and they are also reported here.
In section 4 the data is analyzed in the light of the models described in
the literature review section. First a subset of firms from di↵erent price levels
are taken under a scope, in order to inspect, whether there was some price
dimension, on which the firms might appear similar and misguide consumers.
Second it is described, how obfuscation can be seen in the pricing, and more
specifically what might be behind the firms’ choice of pricing schemes. Third
the ability of firms to screen out non credit worthy customers is taken account
and it is considered how screening would be a source of price dispersion. Lastly
welfare e↵ects of consumer biases have been taken into consideration. Finally
in section 5 conclusions are drawn from the data and the analysis.
2 Literature review
In this section relevant literature considering price dispersion in general, ex-
panded industrial organizations and payday loans are introduced, and associated
with observed price dispersion in payday loan markets in Finland. The section
on expanded industrial organizations covers topics that add useful features into
standard IO theory, that enables the models to capture di↵erent consumers be-
haviors. In this section also a distinct area, behavioral industrial organizations,
is briefly covered. In the first chapter payday loans are defined, their charac-
teristics are described and ways of obfuscation are made transparent. Di↵erent
branches of industrial organizations expansions are briefly introduced, highlight-
ing the role of obfuscation models in explaining price dispersion on payday loan
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market. After that, overview on models that predict price dispersion on market
is given. This is followed by more detailed presentation of three models, that
represent the evolution of such models. In particular model presented in section
2.6 is used as a framework in inspecting dispersion in the payday loan market.
Finally in the Section 2.7, some emphasis is given to firms screening customers in
order to enhance credit portfolios, and screening giving rise to price dispersion.
2.1 Payday loans
2.1.1 Definition of a payday loan
In this thesis payday loans are defined so that they are credits provided by
dedicated firms that are not banks and they usually lend to individual borrowers.
Loans are either revolving or non-revolving. In revolving loans the consumer
has a credit account, from which she can make withdrawals up to some limit,
and the non-revolving are one time loans. The loans have payback times from
few days to few years, but require periodical installments to the loan. Periodical
installments can be fixed or some proportion to the loan or a mixture of these,
for example 12,5 % of the remaining total amount of loan, but at least 100 euros.
Total amount of loan includes interest rates and withdrawal fees in addition to
the loan capital.
The upper limit of line of credit varies, but in Finland it is usually at least
2000 euros, in order to go around legal limitations on the interest rates. Also
additional fees like withdrawal fees are usually included in the loan. The leg-
islation in Finland allows the borrower to payback the loan whenever she is
willing without additional cost. Legislation in many countries require providers
to clearly present their annual percentage rate, that takes account also the pay-
back schedule and additional fees included in the loan. The price of the payday
loan can have many dimension, which later in this thesis is shown to be a source
of confusion of consumers.
For illustration, lets see what an example loan would look like. For example
a revolving loan, that has line of credit granted up to 2000 euros, can include
a withdrawal fee of 5% of the withdrew amount. The loan provider might say
in their marketing material, that they have a monthly rate of 6%, but usually
the providers add the daily rate calculated from the monthly rate besides the
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debt. It should be stated that in Finland it is not allowed to compound interest
of payday loans. In the example it could be possible for the consumer to make
additional withdrawals from the credit line and it is possible for her to pay back
the debt in each point of time without additional costs. In the example 15%
of the remaining credit has to be paid back monthly, was the remaining credit
over 1000 euros otherwise 150 euros is paid monthly.
In this thesis terms borrower and consumer are used interchangeably. Con-
sumer is the identity that consumes lending services of some payday loan firm.
Terms price vector, pricing vector and price scheme all refer to multidimension-
ality of price. For example the price vector or price scheme of some payday loan
firm might be two dimensional and include only monthly rate and a withdrawal
fee. As a side note, In economics price vector usually refers to a vector of prices
of competing firms on some market.
2.1.2 Complexity of price vectors
Like stated above the price vectors in these types of loans can have multiple
dimension. It is common that providers do not show the whole price vector
right away in the first page but instead it is hidden somewhere in the lines of
credit agreement. In many cases the credit agreement are tricky to find from
the company web page and the relevant information is scattered around the
agreement. Extensive combining is required to draw complete picture of the
price vector. The firms usually highlight the free first loans on their sites, to
draw consumers’ attention and disturb price comparison before the consumer
takes the loan. This is further discussed later in the thesis.
Also other features are used to increase the complexity. Some providers
might charge a monthly fee for having an open credit limit. Some firms promise
that they will not charge interest rate for the first month but nevertheless they
charge percentage withdrawal fee, which is typically higher than the monthly
interest rate. On the other hand some firms do not charge withdrawal fee
for the first withdrawals made by the consumer but include it to subsequent
withdrawals. In some firms installments are not constant, but determined by
payback time. For example the loan is not necessarily paid back in even install-
ments in 12 months, but they somehow depend on the remaining loan capital.
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Good example of an installment would be that it is 10% of the borrowed amount
but at least 150 euros. This has to be taken account in annual percentage rate
calculations, that are described in chapter 3.
The large number or firms is also a factor, that increases is also a problem for
consumers, who face search costs. Individual can optimally search few providers,
but it can be di cult to search all the prices. It is no wonder that it is nearly
impossible for a consumer of payday loans to compare prices across producers,
as the pricing schemes can vary in so many dimension, and after that make
conclusions, which of the alternatives would be the best for ones personal needs.
Annual percentage rates are usually calculated on some claimed ”representative”
size of loan, despite of which the rates can be very di↵erent in loans of a di↵erent
size. Examples of this are presented in the later sections.
2.2 Industrial organizations expansions
Consumers are not always able to compare prices across homogeneous products,
which can lead to price dispersion in the market, as firms are able to charge
positive markups. Varian (1980) have argued that ”the ’law of one price’ is no
law at all”. In this section I will cover literature on expansions for industrial
organizations theory, that help to understand di↵erent foundations of why it is
di cult for the consumer to find and exploit best prices in the market. The
literature can be divided into smaller branches according to whether consumers
have non-standard preferences, consumers are overconfident or they are not
able to interpret prices and product attributes between di↵erent alternatives.
Literature also covers situations where consumers are not able to choose the
best price as price search has frictions, the prices are set so that consumers
get confused when they try to compare prices and when there exists excessive
inertia on the market. First in this chapter di↵erent branches of the literature
are first briefly introduced, and then the part of consumer confusion is linked to
competition in payday loan market, that can be seen to benefit from systematic
errors in the decision making of the consumers.
In addition there exists a separate branch of literature that covers behavioral
industrial organizations. Behavioral IO focuses on consumers systematically
failing to optimize their behavior whereas it is easy to include. For example
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if in the following hyperbolic discounting example a naive consumer thinks on
first period, that she has standard preferences and acted accordingly, observes
on second period, that the preferences are in fact di↵erent, which leads to subop-
timal behavior on the first period. The consumer would have Chosen di↵erently,
if she had right idea on her future behavior.
2.2.1 Taxonomy of behavioral biases
According to Grubb (2015a) the most studied non standard preferences are
loss aversion and present bias, that is also related to hyperbolic discounting
Frederick et al. (2002). Loss aversion means that individuals experience losses
more painfully compared to gains of a same size, relative to the current refer-
ence point. Due to hyperbolic discounting present biased individuals are more
impatient towards gains in near future compared to later gains. For example
when asked whether one wants to have an apple today or tomorrow, individuals
tend to have the apple today, whereas if asked whether individual want to have
an apple 50 or 51 days from now, they tend to be more indi↵erent. Therefore
time preferences are inconsistent. There is also evidence that individuals can in-
deed be loss averse Camerer et al. (2011) and present biased DellaVigna (2009).
Referring to the last paragraph of last section, the model is behavioral only if
consumer is naive and does not know her true behavior in the future. Otherwise
the bias can be encorporated to the standard model.
Consumers can also su↵er from overconfidence, overoptimism or both Grubb
(2015a). Overconfident individuals tend to overestimate their ability to predict
their choices in the future. Famous example of overconfidence is consumers who
buys annual gym contract but fail to visit the gym often enough to be better
of compared to purchasing one time tickets DellaVigna and Malmendier (2006).
On the other hand overprecise individuals tend to set too wide confidence inter-
vals around their estimations of future consumption, which for example leads
too much variance of future visits in the gym. Grubb (2015a) also distinguishes
three ways for firms to exploit cognitive biases of consumers. First even though
markets are competitive and prices would otherwise tend to cost, due to over-
confidence and overoptimism firms can exhibit complicated pricing structures
that give rise to market power. Second over confidence does not necessarily
12
increase equilibrium mark ups but consumers su↵er when they overvalue con-
tracts Grubb (2015a). Third helping consumers to comprehend overconfidence
can harm consumers, when firms adjust prices in response Grubb (2015b).
Third branch covers di culties of consumers to choose best price on the
market and act accordingly, and this in the scope of the thesis. For example Baye
et al. (2006) have suggested that the search and switching costs of consumers
cause prices to disperse in equilibrium, when the firms o↵er homogeneous goods.
The intuition is that consumers face a cost to learn price of an additional firm
and a fraction of the customers fail to observe lowest price, while they search too
little and end up buying from a firm that charges higher than the lowest price.
According to Grubb (2015a) the assumption that consumers search optimally
is overly optimistic, when the search frictions stated in the first paragraph are
valid.
2.3 Overview on price dispersion models
From here on the focus will be on price dispersion. In this section overview on
price dispersion will be covered and in subsequent sections corresponding mod-
els are introduced and discussed. Early model of price adjustment by Diamond
is a piece by piece analytical description of a monopoly on a market for some
good. It aims to show, how the search cost limit the number of searches and
how given parameters lead to well defined equilibrium. More recent models of
Varian (1980) and Chioveanu and Zhou (2013) have their roots in industrial
organizations and game theory and they are able to incorporate competition
into the model. These models have equilibria, in which firms engage in strate-
gies, where they choose best responses for their rivals actions. In some cases
pure strategy equilibrium arises, whereas in many situation there exists mixed
strategy equilibria, where firms choose their action according to some probabil-
ity, that maximizes expected profit of the firm. In the following sections these
models are covered in detail.
The idea of search costs inducing price dispersion in the market was among
first suggested by Diamond (1971). From his results arise the famous Diamond’s
paradox, that when a consumer faces a small search cost,   > 0, there is no in-
centive for consumers to search for additional prices, and the firms charge a
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monopoly mark-ups. This is of course a very unrealistic prediction, and later
models predict more moderate e↵ects of search cost on the competitive environ-
ment.
Also Ellison and Wolitzky (2012) suggest search cost model of obfuscations,
but detailed description of the model had to be left out from the thesis. Also
in their model a fraction of consumers have no search cost for the product
and so they are ”savvy”. A fraction of consumers find it time consuming or
otherwise troublesome to interpret the prices, so they are faced with a positive
cost and they can be regarded as ”non savvy”. The consumers learn the length
of the time it takes to learn the price of firm just after they have visited a it.
They specify two models. In the first one obfuscation is costless for firm and in
the second a cost for obfuscation is introduced and changes in equilibrium are
analyzed.
Kaplan and Menzio have researched price dispersion using data from Kilts-
Nielsen Consumer Panel Data set. They study the market from three angles,
where the price dispersion can be observed. 1. when same good is traded in
multiple stores, 2. multiple goods are traded in individual stores, 3. same good
is traded in individual stores at di↵erent times. According to the authors, these
three factors can all contribute in price dispersion. In payday loans market
the situation is equivalent to that of same good traded in di↵erent stores. Due
to lack of intertemporal data it is not possible to check, like in 3., how price
dispersion in the market of interest arises from the ability of firms to change
prices over time. Nor the 2. is not in interest, as there is only one individual
good traded in the market.
Ellison and Ellison (2009) have studied the impact of internet price search
engines on the price dispersion on market for computer memory chips. They
find that internet price comparison platforms can make it drastically easier for
consumers to compare across di↵erent available alternatives. Their empirical
results also show, that charging a low cost on the low quality product category
leads to higher sales in products with higher quality. This is intuitive as web
search engines are usually able to find the cheapest products, when consumer
is looking for ones with medium or high quality. Following the cheapest o↵ers
Consumer ends up searching few producers, that might charge higher prices
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compared to rivals in higher quality categories. Same can be seen also in payday
loan markets, where it is customary, that new customers are o↵ered loans for
free and after that they are charged high fees for new subsequent withdrawals.
Comparison sites might only be able to report the first o↵ers making it di cult
to compare the real prices.
2.4 A model of price adjustment
Diamond (1971) paper have had major influence on price dispersion literature
over the years. The paper is among first ones that aim to explain how prices
on some market deviate from monopoly or competitive prices on equilibrium,
because the consumer faces a search cost. The model does not attach search
cost to any possible cause for the cost but it provides great starting points for
introducing other models that highlight alternative types of consumers in the
following chapters.
2.4.1 Consumer behavior
Approach taken in Diamond’s paper has no foundation on game theory like in
more recent models, but the dynamics on the market rely on set of assumptions,
that define the equilibrium path of a monopolistic firm in the model. Consumer
behavior is characterized by set of variables x, p and z at time t for quantity of
the good, price of the good and the number of periods the consumer has spent
checking prices. The decision to purchase is assumed to depend only on the
price the consumer faces on the current period. The time consumer has spent
searching does not a↵ect the purchase decision in this model. The relationship
between quantity and price is denoted by x(p) and Q denotes all the prices that
lead to purchase in the current period. Actual demand in the market can then
be denoted by x⇤(p) and it satisfies
x⇤(p) =
8><>:x(p) if p 2 Q0 if p /2 Q
It is assumed, that there exists a single cut-o↵ price q, and that consumers
purchase whenever they face a price p, that is lower or equal to q, and this can
also be described following way.
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x⇤(p) =
8><>:x(p) if p  q0 if p > q
Consumers utility depends on the purchase price p and also on the time z,
that the consumer spends searching the prices and it can be denoted by u(p, z).
@u(p,z)
@p < 0 and
@u(p,z)
@z < 0 for all p and z. Marginal disutility of search is
assumed to increase without limit i.e. @u(p,z)@z@z > 0. In addition it is assumed,
that the demands of the consumers define a profit function ⇡(p, x(p)) = px(p),
that is strictly quasiconcave and has a maximum at p⇤. The firms are assumed
to have no costs and constant costs would not a↵ect the optimal price given
quasiconcave profits. From quasiconcavity it can be seen that
8><>:
@⇡
@p > 0 if p < p
⇤
@⇡
@p < 0 if p > p
⇤
The cuto↵ prices of individuals of a type h, who start to search prices at
time ⌧ is identified with qh⌧ .
2.4.2 Aggregate demand
It is assumed, that each period a set of identical consumers enter the market,
which means, that at every period consumers with the same characteristics from
index h come to the market and so the utility functions for type h between dif-
ferent generations would be the same. As di↵erent generations observe di↵erent
prices on the market, the cuto↵ prices can vary between generations.
uh⌧ (p, z) = uh⌧+1(p, z) (1)
Aggregate demand Xt at time t is described in the following equation. The
number of consumers, who represent generation ⌧ and purchase at price p in time
t, is denoted by Nt(p). The summation goes through all the di↵erent generations
on the market. In the model it is assumed, that there are m stores in the market,
and the demand on the market is divided equally among producers, and so each







The firm can take the price setting problem in each period separately, as the
share of consumers going to each store is constant and not dependent on history,
and as there is a large number of firms. The firms do not have to care for the
demand of the consumers, that have walked out of the store. It is also assumed,
that the firms know the demand curve. Given these assumptions, and the firms
being identical they maximize aggregate profits in the market, and the firms







Firms problem has a solution, as N⌧t is continuous from he left and it is
nonincreasing, px(p) is continuous with a maximum at p⇤.
2.4.4 Changes in cuto↵ price
Diamond (1971) has described reasonable restriction on the changes in cuto↵
prices between consumers, that enter the market in di↵erent generations, and
the changes in cuto↵ prices of consumers, who have entered the market earlier,
but decide to stay, not found suitable price. The underlying mechanism for
changing cuto↵ prices in these two alternatives are di↵erent and must be defined
separately.
In the paper it is assumed, that if a consumer decides not to purchase on
one period, she raise her cuto↵ price for the following period, and there are two
reasons for this. Whenever the consumer makes a decision not buy, she needs
to revise her price expectations, and the revision is likely to increase the price,
as the consumer is willing to avoid searching and make purchase as early as
possible. The other reason for increasing cuto↵ prices is the rising marginal
disutility of search, and according to the paper increased cost of searching could
encourage the consumer to buy with higher price than on the previous period.
The consumer who continues searching on the period t+ 1, is assumed to have
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cuto↵ price that follows qh⌧t+1 > q
h⌧ + µ for µ > 0 and is independent of the
other parameters.
2.4.5 Generational di↵erences
In this subsection it is covered how consumers, who enter markets in di↵erent
generations, di↵er in terms of cuto↵ prices i.e. what factors define qh⌧+1t+1 and q
h⌧
t
and how are they related. Diamond relates the di↵erence between qh⌧+1t+1 and
qh⌧t to pt and q
h⌧
t , because consumers might naturally fix their cuto↵s based on
how they perceive the price on the current period. Ideal cuto↵ price q* would
be such, that the consumer would gain same utility on the current period and
on the next period, when firms charge expected price p, which can be seen in
the following equation.
uh(q⇤h, 1) = uh(p, 2) (4)
The equation defines a continuous relationship between q⇤ and p. In the
presence of search cost it can be said, that the the ideal cuto↵ price of a consumer
type h would always be higher than the price in the following period q⇤h(p) > p.
The cuto↵ prices always move towards the ideal one, which provides a restriction
for the process. The current cuto↵ can be above or below the ideal and then
move accordingly for the following period. Formally the situation can be one of
the following.
q⇤h(pt)  qh⌧+1t+1  qhtt
or qhtt  qh⌧+1t+1  q⇤h(pt)
(5)
Also limits are set to avoid di↵erences of cuto↵s between consecutive periods
becoming vanishingly small relative to di↵erence between cuto↵ and ideal cuto↵.
|qh⌧+1t+1   qhtt |  ✏min{1, |q⇤h(pt)  qh⌧ |}, ✏ 2 [0, 1] (6)
For all h and t
2.4.6 Equilibrium analysis
The set assumption determine an equilibrium, in which during time t0 the market
adapts to long-run equilibrium, where pt = p⇤ for all t   t0 In the equilibrium
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consumers are willing to set their cuto↵ prices slightly above the long run price,
as it it worth a little to purchase on this period than on the following periods.
This follows from consumers expectations of price being equal to the equilibrium
price on the next period. In the vicinity of the long-run price actual demand
equals to the underlying demand.
2.5 Benchmark model of price dispersion
Price dispersion can arise from the intuition, that in a market of indivisible
good of a known quality some consumers are ”savvy”, meaning that they have
understanding on the prices and qualities on the market, and so they shop,
wherever they can purchase the product the cheapest. On the other hand some
consumers are non ”savvy”, as they are not able to compare prices and qualities
across sellers, and so they choose randomly from which seller they make the
purchase.
Model from Varian (1980) can be used as a benchmark to describe how price
dispersion arises in such situation, since it is simple illustration how equilibrium
is attained with two groups of consumers. In the model there are n identical
firms, that supply a homogenous product with unit cost c. Consumers have
di↵erent valuations, v, for the product and the fraction of consumers, that have
valuations over the price, v   p, is denoted by q(p). We can write the profit of
a company with a price p ⇡(p) ⌘ (p  c)q(p). The profit function is assumed to
be quasiconcave in p, and the optimal price will be denoted by pm. The fraction
of savvy consumers in the population is  , and like stated above, they buy from
the cheapest supplier. 1    consumers are non-savvy and they make purchase,
whenever their valuation for the product is above v.
2.5.1 Equilibrium analysis
Whenever consumers are either savvy or non-savvy, there exist a pure strategy
equilibrium, and no price dispersion arise. If   = 1 and all of the customers
choose to purchase from the provider selling cheapest, seller engage in Bertrand
competition, so that the price will fall down to c. If   = 0 all of the customers
shop randomly and sellers are willing to charge monopoly price pm for the
product, in order to maximize their profit. In these extreme cases expected
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valuations of consumer surpluses of the two consumer groups V are equal, and
the same is true for the expected profits ⇧. So we can write VN = VS and
⇧N = ⇧S . Expectations are taken over the idiosyncratic valuation for the
product v.
Next consider market, where both savvy and non-savvy consumers exist
and so 0 <   < 1. In the only static equilibrium sellers play mixed strategy
for prices, which induce price dispersion in the market, and savvy consumer
obtains weakly lower price compared to a non-savvy customer. In this setting
VS > VN and ⇧S < ⇧N . In the symmetric equilibrium each firm choose its
price from a cumulative distribution function (CDF) F (p), which satisfies the
following profit function.
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](p  c)q(p) ⌘ 1
n
(1   )(pM   c)q(pM ) (7)
The first part of the equation denotes the expected revenue from the savvy
customers, when the company charges price p for the good. The savvy con-
sumers whose v   p make the purchase, when the seller charges lower price
than its competitors, which happens with a probability 1  F (p)n 1. Then the
second part denotes the expected revenue from the non-savvy consumers, who
have their v   p and to whom company always sell its share of the production.
It applies, that the demand from the savvy consumers is less elastic compared
to the non-savvy consumers. The firm can choose to sell only to the non-savvy
consumers by charging them monopoly price pM . For a firm to be willing to play
the mixed strategy F (•), the firm must be indi↵erent between all prices given
F (•), which induces the equality with right and left hand side of the equation.
The value of F (p) which solves the above profit function is an increasing
function of  , which means, that the higher the fraction of savvy consumers
the more likely firms are to set low prices. We can write F 1(p) < F 2(p)
and  2 <  1 and say, that the distribution of prices with higher fraction of
savvy consumers first order stochastically dominates the distributions of lower
fraction. From this follows, that the savvy consumer who end up paying the
lowest price of n sellers whose prices are independent draws from the F (p) and
the non-savvy consumers, who pay the price from one draw are better of the
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higher   is i.e. also VS and VN and so aggregate consumer surplus increases.
Also industry profit ⇧( ) = (1    )⇡(pM ) increase in  , and therefore total
welfare W at least weakly increases with  .
2.5.2 Search and ripo↵ externalities in payday loan markets
According to Armstrong (2015) search and ripo↵ externalities are inflicted, when
both savvy and non savvy consumers participate in the market. The savvy
consumers, who search for prices and are able to compare them, help non savvy
consumers by granting them a search externality. The search conducted by the
savvy consumers ensure, that the firms are not able to charge monopoly prices,
as firms charging lower prices lure the savvy consumers, and then the non savvy
consumers benefit from this search externality by lower prices. If there existed
savvy consumers on the payday loan market, it could be seen that the consumer,
who pick a loan randomly from some firm, would also benefit and also face lower
prices. Later in section 3 it can be seen, that price dispersion clearly arises in
the Finnish market, which could be evidence of search externality.
Also ripo↵ externalities might arise in payday loan markets. When non-
savvy consumers are not rational with their expectations on some future aspects
on the pricing vector, they can be ripped o↵ by charging low price for the product
and charging high price for additional services, that non-savvy consumers did
not know they had demand for ex ante. This on the other hand can be beneficial
for the consumers of a savvy type, as they can buy the product at a low price
knowing that they do not need the additional features or they have realistic
expectation of their demand for additional services. Good example could be
hotel rooms that come with mini fridges, that include highly priced beverages.
This could lower the price for hotel rooms for all customers, while the non-
savvy consumers endorse the savvy ones by buying the expensive beverages.
The non-savvy consumers are ripped o↵ with high beverage prices.
Consumers on market of interest might su↵er from overconfidence, that We-
instein (1980) suggests to be context dependent. Grubb (2015c) suggests that
firms can introduce pricing tactics to benefit, when consumers su↵er from dif-
ferent aspects of overconfidence. They misforecast usage of the revolving credit
due to overprecision and if they are overoptimistic on their capabilities on pay-
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ing their installments on time, they end up paying reminder fees. This could
induce a ripo↵ externality on the savvy types, who have rational and precise
expectations on their use of the credit, when they get loans cheaper compared
to a situation when there was none or a small number of non-savvy consumers
paying reminders.
2.6 Consumer confusion model
Like stated earlier, payday loan providers are known to set prices in attempt to
make it di cult for the consumer to compare prices across sellers. Additional
costs like withdrawal fees are included, and payment schedule can be tweaked
to further confuse customers. For example one of two firms might introduce
monthly rate and the other might introduce annual rate and a withdrawal fee.
Engaging in these price frames could be su cient to confuse some consumers,
who are not able to compare annual percentage rates for the loans, and there-
fore make their purchase randomly from one of the companies. A fraction of
consumers are able to compare prices among the firms, despite the di↵erent
framing and buy from seller charging the lowest price.
Chioveanu and Zhou (2013) have described oligopolistic price dispersion
model for analyzing situations, where firms try to confuse consumers with price
frame, that di↵ers from its rivals. By a price frame is meant the way, how firms
present their pricing information to the consumers. The model predicts both
price and frame dispersion at the same time. The model also predicts, that the
profits of the firms should be equalized in the equilibrium. Surprisingly more
firms predict less tighter competition and higher prices in this setting.
2.6.1 Price frames
In the model the firms can choose from two di↵erent price frames A and B. A
is always a simple frame and B can be either simple or complex frame. When
both types of frames are used among firms, it is said that firms engage in frame
di↵erentiation. On the other hand firms using same but complex frames B is
referred by frame complexity. Fraction of consumers that get confused, when
both price frames are used among the n companies is denoted by ↵1 and the
fraction of consumers that get confused, when some companies use same but
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complex frame B is ↵2. Whenever both price frames exist in the market and
are compared, it does not matter whether frame B is simple or complex, as the
confusion of consumers arise from the frame di↵erentiation.
In the oligopoly model there are four separate combinations, how the con-
sumers can be confused. Fraction ↵1↵2 of customers get confused from both
frame di↵erentiation and frame complexity. (1 ↵1)(1 ↵2) consumers are able
to compare prices in both situation and though they are not a↵ected by either
framing schemes. (1  ↵1)↵2 consumers are confused by frame complexity and
they are able to find lowest prices, when di↵erent frames A and B are compared.
Last group of consumers are ↵1(1 ↵2) in numbers and they are able to compare
prices among complex frames B but they get confused by frame di↵erentiation.
2.6.2 Decision rules
In oligopoly there is now a combination of A and B frames, and a now decision
rules have to be set for the consumer to make available options comparable.
Firm i0s options can be described by the chosen frame zi and price pi. The
domination of firm i0s o↵er is defined following way. For a consumer, firm i0s
o↵er (zi, pi) 2 A,B ⇥ [0, 1] is dominated if there exists firm j 6= i that has an
alternative o↵er zj , pj < pi and the two o↵ers are comparable. The consumer
decision rule can now be said consists of two parts. First the consumer goes
through the o↵ers and eliminates the ones, that are dominated and second
the consumers follow a stochastic purchasing rule, when they buy from the
undominated firms. Whenever all firms use same frame, the demand is shared
evenly among them. Whenever there exists undominated firms with both A
and B frames, A is chosen with probability  (nA, nB), and B is chosen with
a probability 1    (nA, nB), where nA and nB are the numbers of users of
particular frame respectively. In order to describe profit functions, following
notation is introduced for a probability, that the consumer decides to buy from
a company, that uses frame A, when there also exists k undominated firms with
frame B. The rule does not depend on the price.
 k ⌘  (1, k) (8)
For illumination how the consumers decision rule works in practice, consider
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the following example. The numbers of firms using each frame respectively
are nA = 4 and nB = 3 and they have following price vectors in the usual












B) = (4, 6, 4). We
see that there are two firms, that use frame A, who charge the lowest price 2
and therefore are undominated. There are two firms, that use frame B and
charge price of 4, and are therefore also undominated. Even though the lowest
prices of frame A users are lower than the price of frame B users, they are not
comparable and decision rule has to be applied. Undominated A firm is chosen
with probability  (2, 2) = 22+2 =
1
2 and undominated B firm is chosen with





2.6.3 Results when frame di↵erentation is more confusing than frame
complexity ↵1 > ↵2
Chioveanu and Zhou (2013) find that when ↵1 = 1 > ↵2 and n   2, so that
no consumers are able to compare di↵erent frames, the firms choice of di↵erent
strategies depend on whether all of the price frames on the market are simple,
or whether there are also complex frames beside simple ones. If there are only
simple frames, ↵2 > 0, and n   4 there always exists asymmetric pure strategy
equilibrium, where each frame is used by more than one firm, and the firms set
prices to equal marginal cost. There exists also a symmetric mixed strategy
equilibrium, when n   2, where firms can set higher prices and earn positive
profits.
The probability that k firms among n-1 others engage in frame A in equilib-
rium, can be described by the following equation.
P kn 1 ⌘ Ckn 1 k(1   )n k 1 (9)
Ckn 1 denotes the possible combinations of how k items can be drawn from
n-1 alternatives. The probability that firm adopting frame z charges the lowest
price on the market, is denoted by xz(p) = 1  Fz(p).
Equation 10 describes the profit along the equilibrium path of a firm i, if it
decides to choose frame A. Similarly 11 describes profit, if firm i adopts frame
B
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If all other k = n  1 rivals also play frame A, firm i’s profit is like in part 1
of the equation, taken that i charges the lowest price. The summation expresses
the expected revenue for i, when k < n  1, so there are also firms that choose
frame B. Part 2 of the function gives the profit, when the fraction a2 of the
consumers are confused because of frame complexity and consumers buy from
a provider that has frame A, and i charges lowest price among the firms. Part
3 in the equation shows the profit in the case, that 1   ↵2 consumers are not
confused and therefore they buy, wherever they see the lowest price. In next
















n  k| {z }
2a




The first parenthesis gives the profit, when also all other firms in addition
to i choose frame B, and this happens with probability (1    )(n 1). The
underbrace 1a gives the profit from the ↵2 confused consumers, which divides
evenly among firms, that engage in B frame. Underbrace 2b is the profit from
the non-confused consumers and it goes to the firm charging the lowest price,
which again happens with probability xB(p)n 1. The summation in second
parentheses denotes the expected profit for i, whenever k firms among n   1
others choose frame A. From 2a it can be seen, that i sells to the non-savvy
confused customers, if the consumer makes her purchase from company, that
has set Frame B, instead of a company that has used an A strategy, when there
are k undominated B firms, which happens with probability 1  n k. Profit in
this case is divided among firms, that have played frame B. Lastly the expected
profit from consumers, that are not a↵ected by the frame confusion, can be seen
in 2b. Firm i sells to this fraction, when it charges the lowest price with the
probability, that consumers purchase from firm using B, instead of firm using
A, when there is only one undominated B firm.
In equilibrium the profit in the symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium would
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be.
⇡ = ⇡(A, 1) = (1   )n 1[↵2 n 1 + (1  ↵2) 1] (12)
It was stated, that the upper bounds of price CDF’s do not depend on the
price and they are pA1 = p
A
2 = 1. Then we get the equilibrium proportion of firms
adopting each frame,  , by solving ⇡(A, 1) = ⇡(B, 1). Any price drawn from
distributions FA and FB would lead to equal profits, as they are determined
by ⇡(z, p) = ⇡. The lower bound of prices from the distributions, pz0 < 1, are
determined by ⇡(z, pz0) = ⇡.
If ↵2 < ↵1 < 1 there can also exist price competition between firms using
di↵erent frames, that is di↵erent from the case where ↵1 = 1, and there exist
price competition only among firms, that have adopted same frame.
2.6.4 Results when frame complexity is more confusing than frame
di↵erentiation ↵1 < ↵2
Consider next the case when ↵1 < ↵2 = 1 and n   2. So now none of the
consumers are not able to compare prices, that are presented within frame
B. Again like above, there exists only symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium.
Chioveanu and Zhou (2013) report the following results from the specification.
In the equilibrium frame A is chosen with probability  , and so frame B is
chosen with probability 1    . Firm that uses frame A, draws it price from a
distribution FA, defined on [pA0 , 1). Firm that adopts frame B always charges
highest possible price p=1. Last there is the case where ↵1 < ↵2 < 1. This
specification leads to a symmetric separating equilibrium, where the users of
frame A draw price from a distribution on interval [pA0 , bp], and the users of
frame B draw their price from a distribution defined on [bp, pB1 ]
2.6.5 Larger number of firms
The model predicts, that larger number of firms on the market, which tradition-
ally have implied tighter competition, can in contradiction lead to higher prices
with some high ↵1 and ↵2 values. Increase in the number of the firms in the
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If there are no consumers who are confused by frame complexity, again if
frame B is also a simple frame, ↵2 = 0, and the number of firms tends to infinity,
half on the firms use frame A, and the other half use frame B in the equilibrium.
The profits of the firms are zero. If there is positive number of consumers who
are confused by frame complexity, ↵2 > 0, all firms end up choosing frame B,
and the profits are strictly positive in the market. Later in the analysis section
4 it is showed, how this can be seen in the payday loan market.
2.7 Consumer screening
Price dispersion in the Payday loan market can also arise from alternative
sources. In the credit market loans should be priced so that the lender is com-
pensated for the risk it bears Oliver and Oliver (2014). If the creditworthiness
of a consumer is a random variable, and firms charge one price from all of its
customers, it is possible that consumers are randomly assigned to the provider,
whose price reflects the riskiness of the particular customer. In contrast to mort-
gage lender who might have vast number of risk categories, where customers are
divided based on their credit worthiness, the payday loan market might have
an in built characteristic, that determine the risk level each of the firms serve.
Then it could be argued, that price dispersion arises from serving di↵erent risk
groups of consumers.
Liran Einav (2012) have studied subprime loans in automobile lending and
they have developed a model of consumer demand, that takes account both
borrowing and repayment decisions. The model has a base on consumer theory,
where the utility of a consumer is derived from individual characteristics of the
consumer and the terms of contract o↵ered by a firm. The marginal profits of
the firm increase in the the terms of the contract, and the profit function can be
divided in two parts similarly to standard monopoly situation. The first part
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of profit function reflects the loss of a marginal buyers, and the second part
reflects the e↵ect on contract terms on inframarginal buyers. The firm would
then choose contract, that balances these tradeo↵s. From the model it can be
seen, that marginal borrowers are generally riskier than average borrowers.
The described model can be partly applied to subprime payday loan markets,
where the borrowed cash can be used to purchase a product or service, but these
are not usually easy to collateralize like automobiles. The authors state, that
consumer lenders screen their customers, in order to limit the access of high risk
consumers to the loans. Had the company only a single o↵er for the consumers,
it would be chosen so, that it maximizes the profit function, that was described
in the previous paragraph.
3 Methodology and data
3.1 Annual percentage rate
Annual percentage rate (APR) is a measure, that can be used to make loans
with di↵erent payback times and monthly rates comparable. Legislative au-
thorities impose, that companies should have annual percentage rates visible in
their marketing material, so that consumers can have idea, what are the real
costs associated with the loan. There are multiple ways to calculate the APR
but Finnish authorities require the calculation be carried out by the following









Left hand side of the equations sums up the k ordinal withdrawals Ck from
the line of credit and discounts them from period t to the period of taking the
loan. Ck also captures the withdrawal fees, that are included in the debt capital
at the withdrawal period. Similarly the right hand side sums up the l ordinal
paybacks Dl discounted from period S to the period of taking the loan. The
APR or the internal rate of return r is the rate, with which the present value
of withdrawals and installments are equal. For the above example the APR
would be around 122%, given that there was only one withdrawal in the first
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period. A calculator has been applied in Excel, and solver has be used to return
the APR. The Excel model is included in the appendix. Annual percentage
rate calculations easily captures e↵ect of additional payments like for instance
withdrawal fees. It is also easy to use to vary payback period and installment
amounts.
As payday loan providers in Finland are not able to compound interest to
the capital and so the loan capital will not grow interest on interest, the annual
percentage rate is enough to capture the e↵ect of interest rates. On the contrary
in mortgage lending the interest increases the capital, and this compounding was
it annual, semi-annual or quarterly should be taken account in the calculations.
Consumers are not likely to use extensive APR calculation as a basis for their
decision making, and there might exist some individual factors of the price like
monthly rate or payback time that are more important for consumers. This is
further discussed in the analysis section 4.
3.2 Price data
In this section the data is introduced and its merits and shortcomings are dis-
cussed. Finnish payday loan markets consists of at least 24 firms. The decision
to include a firm depends on the way payday loans were defined in the Section
2.1, which binds all the firms, that were included in the analysis. Internet search
engines and payday loan comparison websites were used to identify firms, that
operate in this specific industry and to calculate annual percentage rates for
each of the companies. This way of finding the companies, that really oper-
ate on the market, proved more e cient compared to using some database of
Finnish financial companies, as the databases tend to report all the companies,
that somehow relate to this specific industry. The problem is, that they do not
necessarily satisfy the set criterion. In addition the right companies would have
had to be identified by visiting their website, to see what their o↵ering really
looks like to the consumer.
It was not possible to include each company for all of the datasets, as some of
the companies chosen for analysis did o↵er only non revolving loans. These com-
panies are marked by asterix in the tables of following chapters. The variables
used were collected from company websites, and the complete documentary on
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price frame was sometimes found only from the terms of agreement. Annual
percentage rate is rigorously explained in the Section 3. Corresponding firms
behind the credit brands are listed in the appendix.
There exists also other Firms, that o↵er similar service on the market but
have di↵erent earnings logic or were otherwise not suitable for this analysis. For
example loan services in which peers lend and borrow money were excluded,
as the intermediaries collect their share from the loans provided by the users.
Also consumer credit provided by banks were excluded, as they execute their
own earnings logic. They collect their debt capital from savings and lend these
funds to the public. It is assumed, that the customer base of these firms di↵er
from the customer base of payday loan providers of interest.
Six data sets were developed using two approaches, that are able to sepa-
rately take account consumer preferences over certain sizes of loans and di↵erent
payback schedules. For 500 and 300 euro loans the inspection is conducted in
two di↵erent ways, that allows to control for the payback time dimension. In the
first approach 500 euro loans are assumed to be paid back in 4 months and 300
euro loans in 3 months time. The payback times where determined by assuming
150 euro monthly installments for each company. In the second approach both
sizes of loans are paid back right after one month. Also 100 euro loan has been
taken into account in this setting, as it was assumed that consumers do not hold
this small loan for a longer than one month. The selection of the loan sizes is
based on the survey of Elliehausen and Lawrence (2001), according to which
97,8% of new payday loans are less than $500 in survey made in the U.S.. The
two ways used to calculate the rates complement each other and allow com-
parison of the prices for two types of consumers. The ones that have demand
for some payback time, and the ones who are willing to pay back as soon as
possible.
The 1500 euros loan was chosen to represent possible ”bigger” loan, when
consumer chooses to follow payment schedule given by the provider. In the
1500 euro category annual percentage rates are calculated by using the terms
of payback, that the firm suggests. In this setting it is therefore assumed, that
consumers are not willing to a↵ect these matters. For example some firms might
suggest payment schedule, in which it takes 12 months to pay back the debt,
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whereas some other firm might collect the loan back in 18 months. The types of
monthly installments also a↵ect the payback time, as the monthly installment
can be in some proportion to the total amount of debt and after some threshold
they become constant or they can be constant the whole time. The total amount
of debt usually includes interest and withdrawal fees in addition to the loan
capital. The payback times of the loans are a factor, that have a major impact
on the annual percentage rate.
There are some sources of imprecision included in the data. First, interests
and withdrawal fees are not necessarily treated the same way in each of the
providers. In one firm monthly installments can be firstly directed to withdrawal
fees, and after that consumers is able to pay interests, and last the capital is
shortened. For simplicity this order of payment allocation was assumed, when
the annual percentage rates were calculated. Some other firm might direct the
installments to parts of the price di↵erently. This shortcoming should not have
major e↵ect on the relative level of APR in the companies. Nevertheless the
order of allocation used in this analysis is the most common among the firms of
interest.
Issues regarding the type of credit should also be taken into account. Brands
Ostosraha, Credento, Credigo, Saldo and Cashbuddy o↵er only non-revolving
loans, and among them only Credigo and Credento o↵er loans under 1000 euros.
These brands are included in corresponding analysis. The brand ”Vivus” of firm
4Finance Oy also does not o↵er revolving credit and its payback times vary from
3 to 30 days, so it is not possible to make straight comparisons in the categories
of longer payback times. The non-revolving credits were included in the analysis
to have more firms in the sample for 1500 euro loan comparison.
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3.2.1 500 and 300 euro loans with monthly installments
This section emphasizes the prices and price distributions of 500 and 300 euro
loans with payback times of 4 and 3 months respectively. Due to monthly
installments scattering among several months, the annual percentage rates are
on average lower compared to the rates of loans of the same size with a single
installment.
Table 1 shows, that in 500 euro loan category the annual percentage rates
vary from 27,9% to 538,2% average rating being 268,64%. Averages and stan-
dard deviations of the distribution are second lowest after 1500 euro loans with
given payback times. Standard deviation is around 157%-points. Like stated
above the non-revolving credits rank in the cheap end of the distribution. 3 firms
were excluded from this sample, as it was not possible to possible to either get a
loan of a size 500 euros, or it was not possible to divide payback over 4 months.
Figure 1 describes the distribution associated with the prices in this group. The
distribution for this sample could somewhat resemble normal distribution, as a
large proportion of the prices is divided on the interval [150%,350%] and almost
even number of firms is divided on the both sides of the this interval.
Table 1 summarizes the prices of 300 euro withdrawal with 3 month payback
time across firms. Lowest rate in this category is nearly twice as high as the
rate of 500 euro loans in this chapter being 49,4%. Also the highest price of
the brand ”Peruslaina” is clearly higher compared to the 500 euro loan, being
as high as 818,7%. Average price and standard deviation also increases in this
category and they are around 383% and 223%-points respectively. In this sample
it can again be seen, that the non-revolving loans can be found from the cheap
end of the distribution. Four Firms were excluded from this sample, for the
reasons discussed earlier. Figure 2 describes the distribution associated with
the prices in this group. The distribution of this sample resembles a log-normal
distribution growing from the left to its peak at around 300% and having a long
tail that descends to the right.
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Table 1: Rates for 500 and 300 euro loan rates with monthly payments (* Non-
revolving loan)
Brand Rate, 500e Rate, 300e rate
* Ostosraha 0,279
* Credigo 1,570 2,287
Credit 24 0,494 0,494
* Saldo 0,616 0,617












Suomen tl. 4,058 5,573
Peruslaina 5,110 8,187
Get capital 4,591 6,238
Lainasto 4,591 6,238
Euro 24 5,382 7,722
Mean 2,686 3,839
Median 2,297 3,675
Std. dev. 1,569 2,229
Variance 2,461 4,970
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Figure 2: Price distribution of 300 euro loans paid back in 2 months
Figure 1: Price distribution of 500 euro loans paid back in 4 months
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3.2.2 1500 euro loans with given installments
Table 2: Rates of 1500 euro loans with given payback times (* Non-revolving
loan)






























Figure 3: Price distribution of 1500 euro loans with given payback times
Table 2 illustrates the rates of 1500 euro loans in the market, when monthly
installations are given by companies, who determine the payback times. Figure 3
shows the price distribution of corresponding prices. Rates vary between 27,9%
an 446,2% and from the table it can be seen, that the standard deviation in
this category is around 119 %-points. In this category the distribution seems to
peak in relatively low price levels and again near the median around 250%-300%.
There are also some observation of firms charging very high prices. The peak
in low price region would imply, that prices are not normally distributed, even
though the distribution peaks near the average, and there are smaller number
of observation on both sides of the average.
3.2.3 500, 300 and 100 euro loans paid back in one month
In this section the annual percentage rates are presented for 500, 300 and 100
euro loans, when they are paid back one month after the withdrawal. Because
of the way how the annual percentage rates are calculated, the rates in these
categories are clearly the highest. Also as di↵erent payback times, and possible
alterations in the sizes of monthly installments do not a↵ect the rates, the rates
tend to be same across the loan sizes, which can be seen in the following price
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tables and distributions. As a reminder, some companies change the install-
ment size from a percentage of the remaining capital to a constant after some
threshold. In addition these rates being the highest, they are also never showed
to a consumer, although according to Elliehausen and Lawrence (2001) these
are loans, that consumers most often take at least in the U.S..
As these are rates, that consumers cannot straightforwardly observe in the
market, and the calculation require some knowledge of algebra, obfuscation
could be seen behind the higher standard deviation in these groups. The price
distribution in this group are similar to each other for the reason, that annual
percentage rates are in most cases same with di↵erent sizes of loans. They also
resemble log-normal distributions, as they peak near the average rates and have
long tails to the right. Small number of companies also charge very high prices.
The standard deviations becomes so much higher compared to earlier categories,
as now some firms become very expensive.
Table 3 shows the rates of 500 euro loans, when they are paid after one
month. Prices in this category range from around 27,95% to 2830% and they are
charged by brands ”Ostosraha” and ”Peruslaina” respectively. Also standard
deviation of the distribution is four times higher higher compared to 4-month-
payback counterpart being 680,6%-points. The average rate have ascended to
666% and it is almost 3 times higher than the average rate with longer payback
time. Non-revolving loans do not rank in the lowest end of the price distribution
anymore. Picture 4 describes the distribution associated with the prices in this
group.
In table 3 prices of 300 euro loans, that are paid back after one month, have
been listed. Now that brand ”Ostosraha” have been excluded from the sample,
the cheapest loan in this category is provided by brand ”Credit 24” with APR
of 49,3%. This also shifts the mean of the distribution higher to 734,6% and
lowers the standard deviation to 666,0% percentage points.
In table 3 prices of 300 euro loans, that are paid back after one month, are
presented. Brand ”Ostosraha” have also been excluded from this sample. Some
prices shift when moving from 300 euro loans to 100 euro loans, so that the
mean of the distribution is 771,5% and standard deviation 670%-points, which
is again due to a few firms, who charge very high rates.
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Table 3: Rates for 500, 300 and 100 euro loans paid back after one month (*
Non-revolving loan)
Brand Rate, 500e Rate, 300e Rate, 100e
* Ostosraha 0,279
* Credigo 4,784 4,784 4,784
Credit 24 0,494 0,494 0,494
* Saldo 0,616 0,616 0,617
OK money 0,616 0,616 0,617
Risicum 4,784 4,784 4,784
Laina.fi 5,304 5,304 5,304
Luottoraha 7,112 7,112 7,112
Nordcredit 0,616 7,064 7,064
Everyday.fi 4,350 4,350 4,350
Vippi 4,350 4,350 4,350
Limiitti.fi 4,350 4,350 4,350
Extraluotto 4,442 7,064 7,064
Ferratum 8,966 8,966 8,966
Flexiluotto 7,480 7,480 7,480
Suomilimiitti 4,350 3,281 3,281
Suomen tl. 4,350 4,350 12,088
Peruslaina 28,282 28,282 28,282
Get capital 13,413 13,413 13,413
Lainasto 13,413 13,413 13,413
Euro 24 19,845 19,845 19,845
* Vivus 4,350 4,350 4,350
Mean 6,661 7,346 7,715
Median 4,396 4,784 5,304
Std. dev. 6,806 6,660 6,700
Variance 46,325 44,360 44,893
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Figure 4: Price distribution of 500 euro loans paid back in one month
Figure 5: Price distribution of 300 euro loans paid back in one month
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Figure 6: Price distribution of 100 euro loans paid back in one month
3.3 Turnover data
The table 4 on the next page shows the turnovers of the firms behind the brand
names in 2014 or later, if it was available. Whenever some brands were under
a specific firm, the turnover was divided equally between di↵erent titles. All
these are Finnish subsidiaries and the data was collected from Orbis database.
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In this section analysis on the data is carried out and the results from the
analysis are reported. In the Subsection 4.1 a subpopulation of four brands
with di↵erent prices with even intervals have been chosen for comparison, in
order to identify, whether they di↵er on some dimensions and whether they
have similarities, that would a↵ect the choice of a consumer. In 4.2 the analysis
of dispersion in prices and turnovers is carried out using the dispersion figures
described in the data section. After that, in the Subsection 4.3, the dispersion is
analyzed in the light of the confusion model, that was described in the literature
review in the Section 2.6. In the next Subsection 2.7 the ability of firms choose
their customers based on some criteria are taken account as a source of dispersion
in prices. Finally in section 4.5 welfare issues of comparison di culties of prices
are taken account in the analysis.
4.1 Comparison of selected firms
In this section I will perform comparison of four brands from di↵erent price
categories, in order to analyze whether their price schemes share some charac-
teristics. The loans might be similar on some some important dimension, which
would make it di cult to compare the prices. For the comparison I have chosen
Credit24, Risicum, Ferratum and Euro24, whose annual percentage rates are
around 50%, 200%, 450% and 750% on 300 euro loans when paid back after one
month.
In the firms’ front pages in the internet all but Euro24, the most expensive
one, reports some dimensions of the price, while Euro24 reports only absolute
amounts of monthly installments and the withdrawal fee. Ferratum and Risicum
reveal the yearly nominal rates, withdrawal fees and annual percentage rates
right on the first page but they do not let the consumers calculate examples of
the installments. Credit24 on the other hand reveals annual percentage rate for
a 1500 euro loan and show what would be the monthly installment for chosen
size of loan and what would be the cost when paid back after one month. All
the firms are the type, that charge consumers withdrawal fees in addition to the
rate. Only credit24 informs clearly how long the pay back period can be and
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Ferratum has included the payback time for 1500 euro loan in the small print.
Credit24, Risicum and Euro24 have a slide switch for choosing withdrawal
amount on the first page. Ferratum has this feature after choosing the standard
loan from the first page. Slide switch is typical way of providers to let the
consumers choose their withdrawal amount. The switches usually have steps in
every 50 euros and consumers might hence take too big of a loan, as switches
might make them think, that they cannot take loan of the size they really want.
in addition for example Risicum do not let the consumer choose freely the exact
loan amount. All but the cheapest of these four clearly highlight ”Apply now”
or similar buttons in the front page in order to capture consumers’ attention.
The monthly rates of these firms vary from 3,4% to 9,9%. Withdrawal
fees are 6,95% on Credit24, 12,5% on both Ferratum and Risicum. Euro24
has also the highest withdrawal fee of 18,9%, and like stated above the rates
and withdrawal percentage is not visible in the front page of Euro24. The
Euro24 brand is unambiguously the most expensive alternative among these
four brands measured by the variables above, yet it has positive sales. Among
Credit24, Ferratum and Risicum it is clearly more di cult to tell, which of the
alternatives is most expensive. Taken 1500 euro loan the annual percentage rate
of Credit24 is the cheapest, Risicum price seems second highest, were the loan
amount 2050 euros and Ferratum seems the most expensive one on the first
glance, when they present the annual percentage rate of 1500 euros. From these
it is not possible to say, how would the brands compare, were the loan amounts
di↵erent. For these four the annual percentage rates gives a good proxy, how
the brands rank relative to the other three with other loan amounts.
Also google searches yield very di↵erent results depending on how the key-
words are framed. It is notable that search with ”Pikavippi” results only Ferra-
tum among these alternatives, ”Pikalaina” results both Ferratum and Risicum.
Keyword ”Halpa pikavippi” does not result in any of these alternatives in the
first page. All of these keywords result also in other brands that are covered in
this thesis. They also reveal price comparison sites and links sites of firms, that
provide other types of loans. It is fundamental, that internet search engines
yield somewhat random results, when payday loan related keywords are used.
It can be, that the consumers make their price comparison based these search
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results, it is possible, that consumer is not able to compare, if the search result
firms present their price information very similar manner.
It seems that individuals discussing in the internet bulletboards lack exper-
tise and financial literacy, and the discussions has quite low overall level. Very
few writers seem to understand concept of annual percentage rate and be able
to explain it clearly and unambiguously to their peers. Some people properly
share information, from which firm they have gotten loan and do they regard it
as cheap, but this information cannot be used to deduct, whether the provider
is really cheap, for the same reasons that have been already discussed. Some
lists of providers are linked for everyone to review the pages, but from these
it is can di cult to compare alternatives, as no information is refined for con-
sumers. Some post are heavily under purposeful try to irritate other users,
namely ”trolling”, which makes it di cult for a reader to identify what is the
real content of a thread, and what are the threads that provide useful informa-
tion. It seems plausible, that also the representatives of firms try to a↵ect how
consumers reading the bullet boards view their own products, masking them-
selves as peers and posting messages that highlight their own products. It seems
plausible assumption, that the information in internet bulletboards is not very
valuable for the consumers.
All the firms also share some features. They highlight how special they are
on some feature. Some claim to be inexpensive compared to rivals, some claim
to be special, because they have even monthly installments and some brands
highlight, that they are completely of a Finnish origin. In addition most of the
firms underline their trustworthiness, as the industry has a terrible reputation.
It would be interesting to see whether consumers, who lack financial literary,
draw some kind of equality between trustworthiness and prices. ”I can trust
you to be inexpensive, because you say, that I can trust you”. Declaring to
be trustworthy is nothing but words. Firms must be trustworthy in a sense,
that they do not engage in criminal activities and they carefully take care of
customers’ financials, but they certainly do no have obligation to charge low
prices or overlook customer, who have trouble paying back the loan, if she has
not understood the terms of an agreement. It might be, that words or stories
drive the demand more than prices, when prices are di cult to comprehend.
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4.2 Price and turnover dispersion
An interesting observation is that among the firms, that o↵er revolving credit,
the order in terms of nominal monthly rate and the annual percentage rate of
1500 euro loans with given payback time is almost the same. At di↵erent price
levels there are firms, that charge the same nominal rate and their reciprocal
order cannot be changed without loosing the order between the two types of
rates.
Also the distributions derived from di↵erent sizes of loans with di↵erent pay-
back times are very much alike. Like argued in the data section they somewhat
resemble log normal distributions, while there is some probability mass in the
low price values, a peak before the mean and then a long tail to the right. The
non revolving loans do not always posses the lowest prices, even thought the
providers might carry lower risk compared to revolving credit providers, and
so it does not make sense to exclude these values from the dataset. It is dif-
ficult to go deeper into explaining how the price distributions get this kind of
form. Clearly there are some observations around the mean, where a large frac-
tion of all observations are located. Maybe most companies think, that they
should price their product somewhere near the mean. There does not seem to
be much correlation in prices and turnovers, which would indicate, that this is
not necessarily the best way to price, as consumers do not go to great extent in
comparing prices. On the other hand if started from the peak, the distribution
steadily descend to the right, which could reflect, that the distribution of riski-
ness of consumers would have a tail to the right. There would a greater demand
from low risk consumers, and the higher risk consumers are served by the firms
charging higher prices.
Major dispersion seems to arise also in firm turnovers, which can be seen
from the data. Despite the limitation described in section 3.3, it can be argued,
that the dispersion in the turnovers indeed exists. The theory would suggest,
that the profits would be equalized among producers, when they randomize over
prices and price frames was the problem symmetric. Collective labor agreements
in Finland guarantee even labor costs in customer service and paying the loans
to customer accounts. On the other hand it would be interesting to see, whether
firms are able to borrow in equal terms. It is out of the scope of this thesis, how
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for example marketing e↵orts and the brand equity of the companies a↵ect the
search costs of consumers. Due to major marketing e↵orts of some companies
might they easily leave other companies in the shadows. In a sense marketing is
a way to induce a cost to a consumer to find competitors or other way around
paying for the consumer to avoid cost of finding firms product.
In addition the comparison of the turnovers of di↵erent brands is trouble-
some, as some firms have multiple firms on the market providing similar product,
and it is di cult to say, what proportion of the revenues of the firm can be at-
tributed to which subsidiary. In addition it is di cult from this data to say,
whether these firms take part in other businesses in addition to payday loans,
that would contribute to the total turnover numbers, that were available in
database. Some very high turnovers might be explained by some other busi-
nesses, that other firms in the industry are not involved in, which makes them
incomparable.
4.3 Obfuscation
In line with the consumer confusion model of Chioveanu and Zhou (2013) all
of the firms are using complex price frames, as the firms include more than
one dimension in the frame. It seems that assumption, that there is very large
proportion of consumers, who are confused by the frame complexity, i.e. ↵2
is close to 1, seems valid, as sorting the alternatives to price order requires
su cient financial literacy. The observation that all firms have chosen complex
frames would imply, that the probability of using frame B, 1     = 1. This is
again in line with the model prediction, which implies that whenever the number
of firms tend to infinity, and there is positive number of consumers confused by
frame complexity, the number of firms choosing complex frame tends to one.
This can be seen from section 2.6.5. As the number of firms in the industry is
as high as 24, this seems a plausible assumption. In addition the model predicts
positive profits in the industry. It can be seen from the turnover data, that all
of the firms at least are able to generate sales.
As the pricing schemes are di cult to comprehend, the consumers might
anchor on some other dimension of the price, that is easier to grasp on. The
anchor for comparison can be for example the monthly installment, from which
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the consumers picks the lowest one, payback time, if the alternative with longest
payback time is chosen, monthly rate in the case that alternative with lowest
rate is chosen. Also some consumers might base their decision on the lack of
withdrawal fee. On the other hand some of these consumers may not be able to
avoid withdrawal fees, that are included to subsequent withdrawals following the
first one, due to su↵ering from overprecision in estimating future consumption.
Revolving credits are based on accounts of a certain amount, from which
the consumers can withdraw the amount she needs at the time. This can make
changing costly. On some instances there is also a cost to have an open credit
account within a firm, and in this case consumers would need to go through a
troublesome process of closing the account, which could require an underwritten
document sent to the firm in post. The accounts are also made easy to use on a
computer or a mobile device, and switching to other provider would induce a cost
in learning the new platform. Also a consumer with rational expectations on
future prices might have some idea, how the current price she is paying compares
to alternatives but if she is obfuscated, what is the probability changing would
lead to paying a lower price.
In payday lending consumers might su↵er from overprecision, when they try
to estimate how many consecutive withdrawals they might make from the credit
account. Many firms do not include withdrawal fee to first withdrawal, but it
is included to subsequent withdrawals. The consumers who accurately estimate
future withdrawals avoid these costs or they know to expect them. Consumers
with naive expectations on future borrowing might end up paying these costs
and they might provide a rip o↵ externality on the consumers with rational
expectations.
4.4 Consumer screening
A natural reason for price dispersion would be consumer screening carried out by
the firms. The firms would prefer choosing a risk level they are willing to accept
and set a price accordingly. The payday loan firms are able to some extent
screen customers by observing riskiness of individuals using external services
like ”Suomen Asiakastieto” in Finland or using their own riks measures. Being
able to screen out some customers, that exceed the allowed risk level, might
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cause consumer to try to get loan from other firm, that might allow for more
risk but also charge higher price. This way companies screening out too high
risks for their price might lead to price dispersion, as the set of customers that
di↵er in riskiness are served by a set of firms, that reflect the risk taking by
price.
The information among loan market participants is nearly ever perfect, and
firms end up serving customers, who fail to take care of the loan payments.
Liran Einav (2012) estimated, that in automobile lending market screening cus-
tomers enhance firms profits by 22%, and if perfect information of the customers
credit worthiness was available, the profits would increase as much as 98%. This
would also imply, that the firms are not able to screen out great proportion of
their lending risk.
Liran Einav (2012) also find, that larger loans decrease the likelihood of
repayment substantially. Thus the analysis was conducted for automobile lend-
ing, straight connection to payday loan lending cannot be drawn, but a few
confluences could be identified. Some consumers fulfill their loan demand from
multiple sources, which increases the risk for each lender. Had the borrower
problems with her consumption, the risk of additional lending could be even
more apparent. On the other hand the high price of payday loans might cause
troubles, even when borrowed amounts are for example around 2000 euros, and
consumer decides to pay back in small installments during a long time period.
4.5 Welfare issues
There are competing views whether payday loans are welfare enhancing or wel-
fare destroying. Morse (2011) has studied the relationship between foreclosures
after natural disasters and existence of payday lenders in California. She con-
cludes, that the payday lending might be beneficial for individuals who would
otherwise face foreclosures or commit small property crimes in the times of fi-
nancial distress. She also states, that it is likely, that if the borrowing is to
finance temptation consumption, the welfare results are likely to turn out neg-
ative. O’Donoghue and Rabin (2006) argue, that payday loans are indeed used
to finance temptation consumption.
The social security systems might have an e↵ect on the payday loan markets
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on both demand and supply side. Di culties of consumers might di↵er to a great
deal in Finland from the state of California due to di↵erences in social security
systems. For example the assistance that unemployed individuals receive in
Finland might a↵ect the demand side, as the benefits may limit the use of
consumer credit. On the supply side the firms maybe willing to lend to these
individuals, as firms know that these individuals get a constant flow of subsidies,
that can be used to cover monthly installments.
The consumers might also su↵er from insu cient financial literacy, which
have been discussed earlier in this thesis, and which Stango and Zinman (2011)
have showed to prevail in consumer credit market. By insu cient financial
literacy is meant, that consumers are not trained to perform the necessary
calculations, in order to take account the factors, that a↵ect the net price of
the product or service. The shortcomings in financial literacy give rise to firms
benefiting from biases of consumers, that consumers have on some aspect of the
price frame.
As the firms operate in the internet, all of them have own platforms and some
of them have also expanded the platform to mobile devises for easier access. It
requires e↵ort to learn to use di↵erent platforms, so consumers might anchor to
one company instead of changing for cheaper one. This can be true when prices
change, and when consumers observers a better o↵er from other firm. Like
stated earlier, also closing the account in one firm can be made troublesome,
as it can be required from the customer to send underwritten documents with
certain information to the firm.
Lastly there are always a small proportion of consumers, who are not able
to comprehend the costs of the credit and in fear of marks in payment registry
take additional credit to finance their earlier liabilities. It is possible, that these
credit buildings can be maintained for an extensive period of time, until they
collapse, when the amount of debt becomes too large to bear. These cases induce
credit losses to loan providers, and they can be very harmful for the individuals




In this section conclusions and discussion based on the results are covered. Also
suggestions on possible actions for legislators are given based on the evidence
and the corresponding literature.
Even though firms in the payday loan industry claim in their consumer
communication, that they are open in their pricing, in many aspects they are
not. It can be di cult to make the comparison between di↵erent sizes of loans
within a single producer and even more di cult between firms. In many cases
the firms hide the prices, that a typical consumer who needs up to 500 euros
loan, actually faces. Instead a price for a higher amount of loan with a lower
rate is communicated, without stating that the prices of di↵erent sizes of loans
of a single provided might vary to a great extent. Taking a di↵erent size of loan
than the one of which price is informed in the company website, is likely to lead
paying too much for the service.
The assumption that obfuscation makes it di cult for consumers to com-
pare payday loan prices seems plausible. The price dimension vectors were
complicated in a way, that the typical consumers are not available to compare
prices across firms, and it would be likely, that they are not able to identify
the cheapest provider on the market. The comparison for this thesis was time
consuming to make, and it is easy to imagine, that it would be nearly impossible
for an individual without a proper training to perform calculations with annual
percentage rates.
Lack of proper price comparison services, that usually are not able to take
account the range of price dimensions or that muddle first time o↵ers to the
standard prices, can be very harmful for consumers. In the presence of switching
costs, comparison sites can lead consumers to pick a service, that is detrimental
for their well being later. Making thorough comparison among di↵erent loans
can be expensive, as there are fixed costs in building the computer software
for calculating the rates, and the quotes need be revised in a regular basis. If
the consumers are not willing to pay for these services due to informational
asymmetries, there exists no incentives for firms to provide such service. There
exists also a moral hazard, as the comparison services might cooperate with the
loan providers by posting price quotes for the loans that they want, and so the
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incentives are not in line with the consumers.
In the likely case that consumers choose loans by comparing some factors
other than annual percentage rates, it is likely that consumers are worse of. It
would be easy for legislator to limit the ways the companies have to make it
di cult to compose comparable prices. For example it could be imposed, that
the only price dimension allowed is monthly or annual interest rate. Allowing
both would already induce frame di↵erentiation and some consumers might get
confused. Limiting the dimensions by forbidding dimension one by one might
not work, since it is easy for firms to come up with innovative pricing schemes.
Obfuscation model would predict, that the procedure could limit the number of
firms on the market as the competition becomes tighter. Another way to avoid
obfuscation could be, that firms have to reveal the annual percentage rate of
the loan, that consumer actually takes. For example if the firm told its APR
for 1500 euro loan, it should separately calculate the APR for the consumer
prior the borrowing, took she loan of another size. Now the consumer would be
better equipped to compare prices for the loan size she is willing to take.
The cognitive biases are inbuilt in the human nature, and as such it is di cult
to provide guidance to avoid being ripped o↵ in consumption. The knowledge of
existence of the biases is not su cient to observe these in others and especially in
one self, and changing ones behavior would prove even more di cult Kahneman
(2011). Only imagination limits the ways how firms could benefit from these
biases, and they are likely eat away consumer surplus in markets, where these
kinds of tactics are easy to apply. In addition to payday loan industry the
abuse of biases can be easily seen in mobile plans, that charge additional fees
after some usage limits, insurance companies, that can benefit from consumers
overestimating probabilities of rare events and also in many other industries.
The parallel comparison of selected firms showed, that firm webpages share
some similarities, in addition to reporting important price factors on the front
page and they were a proxy for the price level of the firms. Unfortunately
most of the firm webpages are stacked with irrelevant information, that easily
distracts consumers. It can be, that consumers are a↵ected by the quality of
the firm website, as it might draw a picture of a firm that handles consumers
financials with care, which can be seen increase in quality of the service. The
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attention of consumers is drawn away from the price information, and in many
cases the complete information can be found in the terms of agreement, that
are hidden in the firm webpages. This is likely to make it very di cult to find
and exploit relevant information.
Marketing e↵orts of companies reduce the cost for consumers to find their
products and they are also likely to increase the perceived quality of the service.
In addition consumers might think, that the service has high quality, as the firm
is able to advertise in the television. Based on personal experience, It seems that
only a small proportion of payday loan firms actually advertise on television and
little higher proportion on the radio. This might create an illusion, that there
are only a small number of firms in the industry to choose from. The firms that
spend heavily on advertising might be able to charge higher prices, as they pay
something, in order to reduce search cost of the consumers.
6 Appendix
In this section the excel formulas for annual percentage rate calculations are
given in 6.1 for those, who wish to replicate the study. In the excel sheet on
row 3 the changing variables: rate, withdrawal fees, withdrawal and installment
sizes are described. From left to right the capital column refers to amount
of remaining capital in each period, withdrawal fees to remaining withdrawal
fees and interest to remaining interest. The total column calculates the sum of
these. Minimum installment column shows the installment of the period. The
formulations are such that installments are first directed to withdrawal fees, then
to interest and finally to remaining capital. Remaining capital grows interest
each period. In the sheet at page 54 also the formulas that are used to run excel
solver are presented. In Column G the powers for discount factor of each period
are calculated and the discounted cash flows can be found in column H. The
sum of these cash flows are in column I. The changing cell which refers to the
rate, that equalizes withdrawals and paybacks is in cell H5. Also the origins of
the firms used in this thesis are given in 7.2.
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6.1 Excel formulas in APR calculations
Figure 7: Excel formulas
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Figure 8: Ecxel formulas continued
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6.2 Firm origins
Table 5: Firm origins
Brand Firm Location
Ostosraha Opr vakuus FIN
Saldo Tact Finance Oyj FIN
Luottoraha C Finance Oy FIN
Nordcredit Lainasto Oy FIN
Everyday.fi Opr vakuus FIN
Vippi Tact Finance Oyj FIN
Limiitti.fi Tact Finance Oyj FIN
Extraluotto J.W.-Yhtio¨t Oy FIN
Ferratum Ferratum OYJ FIN
Flexiluotto 4Finance Oy FIN
Suomilimiitti J.W.-Yhtio¨t Oy FIN
Suomen tililuotto NDN-Yhtio¨ Oy FIN
Peruslaina TOP Finance Oy FIN
Get capital Get Capital Oy FIN
Lainasto Lainasto Oy FIN
Euro 24 Euro24 Finance Oy FIN
Vivus* 4Finance Oy FIN
Credit 24 International Personal Finance Plc GBR
Credento TF Bank AB SWE
Credigo Northmill AB SWE
Cash buddy JSM Financial Groupiin SWE
OK money Dollar Financial Group USA
Risicum Dollar Financial Group USA
Laina.fi Dollar Financial Group USA
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